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STATES' RIGHTS AND STATE STANDING
Stephen L Vladeck *
To allow the states to litigate in this fashion . .. would be
a fundamental denial of perhaps the most innovatingprinciple of the Constitution: the principle that the federal government is a sovereign coexisting in the same territory with
the states and acting, not through them, like some international organization, but directly upon the citizenry, which is
its own as well as theirs.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Writing for the 1966 volume of the Supreme Court Review, Professor Alex Bickel was hardly bashful in his criticism of the Supreme Court's disposition of three high-profile cases from the preceding Term, each of which had raised fundamental constitutional questions of first impression about the newly enacted Voting Rights Act of 1965.2 Although his objections to the Court's decisions in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections' and Katzenbach

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington College of Law. J.D., 2004, Yale Law School; B.A., 2001, Amherst College. My
thanks to Kevin Walsh for inviting me to participate in the 2011 Allen Chair Symposium
for which this essay was prepared, and to Aminah Qureshi and the staff of the University
of Richmond Law Review for their patience. Although I co-authored the Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Federal Jurisdiction in Support of Appellant in Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), which argued against Virginia's standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the ACA (and from which some of the arguments offered
herein have been derived), the views expressed in this essay are mine alone.
1. Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 89 (1966).
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 (2006)). See generally Bickel, supra note 1. As Bickel put it, "[v]ery
few statutes can ever have been drafted with a warier eye to the prospect of litigation, or a
keener intention to ward it off as long as possible, than the Voting Rights Act." Bickel, supra note 1, at 79. Indeed, as Bickel continued, "[i]t was enacted ... as a substitute for litigation, which had proved a sadly inadequate engine of reform." Id.
3. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that Virginia's poll tax violates the Fourteenth

845

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

846

[Vol. 46:845

v. Morgan4 went to the merits,' his real frustration with Chief
Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, which upheld several of the Voting Rights Act's central
provisions as valid exercises of Congress's power to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment," was that it reached the merits in the first
place.'
Bickel's encomium that the Justices should rely on justiciability doctrines as a means of avoiding difficult constitutional questions on the merits was by then well known.' And in South Carolina, Bickel simply couldn't understand the theory pursuant to
which a state could have standing as a plaintiff to challenge the
constitutionality of an act of Congress.' After all, if states were
generally entitled to sue on behalf of their citizens to challenge
the constitutionality of federal regulation, not only would the
Court be turning its back on a venerable line of precedent dating
back at least to Massachusetts v. Mellon in 1923,0 but in doing so,

the Justices would risk-in Bickel's view-opening the floodgates." As he explained,
the nature of the federal union, the power and function of Congress
and the President, and the power and function of the judiciary all
would be radically altered if states could come into the original ju-

Amendment).
4. 384 U.S. 641, 643, 658 (1966) (upholding section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act as a
valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
5. Bickel, supra note 1, at 95, 100 (discussing Bickel's merit-based objections to Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections and Katzenbach v. Morgan).

6. See 383 U.S. 301, 323-37 (1966); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce [Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment] by appropriate
legislation.").
7. See Bickel, supra note 1, at 80-93.
8.

See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The

Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40-79 (1961) (describing instances where the Supreme Court has declined to exercise jurisdiction because of standing and case and controversy); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (2d ed. 1986) (determining that the Supreme Court should

only render final judgments and avoid those opinions which would be susceptible to administrative revision).
9. See Bickel, supra note 1, at 86-88.
10. 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923) (stating that the Supreme Court only decides judicial
controversies brought by a party who "must be able to show not only that a statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury
as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally").
11. See Bickel, supra note 1, at 88-90.
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risdiction at will to litigate the constitutional validity of national law
12
applicable within their territories.

Lest the point be missed, Bickel elaborated that "[i]t would make
a mockery . .. of the constitutional requirement of case or contro-

versy ... to countenance automatic litigation-and automatic it
would surely become-by states situated no differently than was
South Carolina in this instance." 3
Indeed, that South Carolina was granted leave to file an original bill of complaint in the Supreme Court made even less sense
to Bickel, given that the federal government had simultaneously
sought to bring its own original action against Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana in which similar issues would have been
raised, a suit that necessarily presented far fewer jurisdictional
difficulties." In Bickel's view, if the Justices' true goal was to
reach the merits, they could easily have done so by granting leave
to file to the federal government, thereby avoiding the need to
pervert standing doctrine to decide South Carolina." Instead, on
the same day that the Justices granted leave to file to South Carolina (over three dissents), they denied leave to the federal government,1 and thereby chose "what was jurisdictionally by far the
weaker of the two cases offered."" Because the Court ultimately
reached the merits in South Carolina, Bickel predicted trouble
down the road, anticipating that, "[t]ime and again, precisely like
a council of revision, the Court would be pronouncing the abstraction that some law generally like the one before it would or would
not generally be constitutional in the generality of its applications.""
With nearly a half-century of hindsight, it seems clear that
Bickel's dystopian vision never materialized. Although first-year
constitutional law students learn about Oregon v. Mitchell,"

12. Id. at 88-89.
13. Id. at 89-90.
14. See id. at 83-84. Perhaps for strategic reasons, Attorney General Katzenbach decided not to object to the Court's jurisdiction to entertain South Carolina's action. See id.
at 85-86 & n.25.
15. See Bickel, supranote 1, at 83-86 & n.25.
16. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 382 U.S. 898, 898 (1965) (mem.), with
United States v. Alabama, 382 U.S. 897 (1965) (mem.). Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart would have denied South Carolina's motion for leave to file. South Carolina, 382 U.S.
at 898.
17. Bickel, supra note 1, at 86.
18. Id. at 90.
19. 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (striking down part of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
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South Dakota v. Dole,20 New York v. United States," and other
cases in which states appeared able to proceed as plaintiffs in
challenges to the constitutionality of federal statutes,22 these cases have been the exceptions that prove the rule-that, notwithstanding South Carolina, Mellon is still good law; states still do
not generally have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
federal regulation on behalf of their citizens; and, more generally,
the floodgates have not opened.
In this symposium essay, I use Virginia's challenge to the constitutionality of the minimum essential coverage provision of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ACA")23 to
explain this apparent lacuna. Indeed, my thesis is that, for a deceptively simple reason (and one by which the Supreme Court has
consistently abided), Bickel's critique of South Carolinawas right
in theory but wrong in practice: although states may not generally challenge the constitutionality of federal regulation on behalf of
their citizens, there are a handful of constitutional provisions under which the federal government operates on the states qua
states, and not merely as a proxy for their citizens. However one
describes the states' "interests" in such cases, those circumstances are qualitatively different from cases in which the states are
merely aggregating their citizens' objections to federal legislation.
Thus, when a state truly is the federal stakeholder against the
federal government, state standing is not just appropriate, but
necessary; thanks to the Court's modern standing jurisprudence,
there may be cases in which no private party would otherwise be
able to maintain the same lawsuit.24 In contrast, when the state
possesses no federal interest distinct from its citizens, allowing

1970 as exceeding Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
20. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding as a valid exercise of Congress's Spending Clause
power a federal statute that conditioned states' receipt of certain federal highway funds on
adoption of a minimum drinking age).
21. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down part of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985 on the ground that it commandeered state legislative policy in
violation of the Tenth Amendment).
22. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517-19 (2006).
23. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 244 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A) (Supp. IV 2010)).
24. Cf. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S._, _,
131 S. Ct. 2355, 2360 (2011) (holding
that individual defendants in criminal proceedings are entitled to challenge the validity of
a federal statute on Tenth Amendment grounds); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939) (holding that private plaintiffs lack standing to challenge federal regulation on Tenth Amendment grounds).
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state standing in suits against the federal government would implicate all of the concerns Bickel cogently articulated in 1966.
So understood, the Fourth Circuit's rejection of Virginia's
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the ACA in Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius 2 6 is not just faithful to precedent, but
consistent with precisely this distinction. Whatever else one may
think about Congress's power to require private citizens to purchase health insurance, it is difficult to see the argument that the
ACA interferes with a federal interest specifically possessed by
the states qua states." To be sure, Virginia attempted to manufacture such a claim by enacting a state law that expressly conflicted with the ACA.2 8 But if Bickel's thesis is correct, preemption
of a state's law by the contested federal law cannot of itself provide the basis for state standing against the federal government-or else we very well might see the "mockery" of which
Bickel warned.29
Stepping back from the politics of the moment, though, this
thesis would suggest that, Bickel's objections notwithstanding,
the Supreme Court's decision in South Carolinawas also correct.
The Court there reached the merits of South Carolina's claim that
Congress had exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth
Amendment-a provision that only applies to, and only empowers
Congress directly to act upon, states." In contrast, when it came
to South Carolina's other constitutional challenges to the Voting
Rights Act, Chief Justice Warren concluded that

25. See Bickel, supra note 1, at 85-87.
S. Ct. - (U.S. Sept.
26. 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
27. States might have a separate Tenth Amendment challenge to part of the Medicaid
provisions of the ACA, but Virginia sought only to challenge the minimum essential coverage provision-which imposes no obligation whatsoever on states. See id. at 266-67.
28. Compare Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1
(Cum. Supp. 2011) (providing with exceptions not relevant here that "[n]o resident of this
Commonwealth ... shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance
coverage"), with Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 244 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010)) (requiring individuals to maintain minimum insurance
coverage).
29. Bickel, supra note 1, at 89-90. That is to say, although preemption by the objectionable federal policy might "injure" the state for Article III purposes, the state must still
be seeking to enforce a substantive federal right in order to get around Mellon. Cf. Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242-44 (10th Cir. 2008).
30. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966). By definition, only
"state action" can violate Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.).
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[t]he word "person" in the context of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation,
be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our
knowledge this has never been done by any court. Likewise, courts
have consistently regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I
and the principle of the separation of powers only as protections for
individual persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt. Nor does a State have
standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional
provisions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen."

South Carolinathereby only reinforces the conclusion that states
may not seek to enforce constitutional interests against the federal government which they don't themselves possess.
Ultimately, this essay concludes that state standing in suits
against the federal government depends on the literal scope of
states' "rights." And for perhaps the very same reasons why Bickel criticized South Carolina, the Supreme Court has been quite
careful to police the distinction between cases in which the state
is suing to enforce its federal interests (like South Carolina), and
those-like Virginia-in which it is not.32 Put another way, notwithstanding the absence of careful explication of this idea in the
Court's jurisprudence, it is nevertheless ubiquitous.
To make this argument, Part II offers a capsule summary of
the Supreme Court's background jurisprudence with respect to
state standing. In Part III, I turn specifically to the cases in
which the Court has allowed states to proceed as plaintiffs
against the federal government, many of which include little if
any discussion of the state's standing. As Part III suggests, in
each of these cases, there is a clear and concrete federal interest
possessed specifically by the state that the state plaintiff sought
to vindicate. Finally, Part IV turns to Virginia, and explains why
no such interest arises in the context of the ACA, notwithstanding the district court's conclusion to the contrary. As Part IV concludes, were Virginia to have standing to challenge the ACA, then
we might indeed realize the parade of horribles against which
Bickel railed.

31. South Carolina,383 U.S. at 323-24 (citations omitted).
32. Compare South Carolina,383 U.S. at 307-08, with Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656
F.3d at 269.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE STANDING

There is perhaps no better scholarly work on the history of the
Supreme Court's approach to state standing than an eponymous
1995 Virginia Law Review article coauthored by Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins." Indeed, anyone who finds this subject of more than passing interest would do well to start with
their 134-page masterwork on the subject, which surveys both the
history of and competing theories animating the Supreme Court's
approach in all suits brought by states, not just those against the
federal government." But whereas Woolhandler and Collins were
interested in the full universe of state standing issues (against a
multitude of potential defendants)," my focus here is somewhat
more discrete: The question implicated in Virginia is whether a
state has standing as a state to challenge the constitutionality of
a federal statute on the ground that the federal statute preempts
a contrary state law." As the following discussion of the Supreme
Court's state standing jurisprudence suggests, that question
should not have been too difficult to answer in the abstract.
A. Parens Patriae, FederalDefendants, and the "Mellon" Rule
The fountainhead case in this field is the Supreme Court's 1922
decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon." Like its companion case,

Frothinghamv. Mellon, Massachusetts v. Mellon involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Sheppard-Towner (or Maternity) Act of 1921, which provided matching federal funds for private programs designed "to reduce maternal and infant
mortality."" In Frothingham, the Court rejected the claim that a
private plaintiff had standing to challenge the federal Spending
Clause statute merely because she was a taxpayer;3 9 in Mellon, an

33. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REv. 387 (1995).
34. See generallyid.
35. See id. at 392-96.
36. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269, 271-72.
37. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
38. Id. at 479 (citing Sheppard-Towner (or Maternity) Act of 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat.
224 (repealed 1927)).
39. See 262 U.S. at 486-89. Frothingham was decided together with Mellon, see id. at
478, and rejected a taxpayer's standing to bring the same challenge. Id. at 48"89; see Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn,

-

U.S. _,

-,

131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442-43

(2011) (discussing Frothingham and the evolution of the Court's taxpayer standing jurisprudence).
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action brought in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the
Justices confronted the separate claim that Massachusetts had
standing to proceed as parens patriae-thatis, as the effective
parent of its citizenry.4 0 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Sutherland disagreed:
It cannot be conceded that a State, as parens patriae,may institute
judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the
operation of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government. In that field it
is the United States, and not the State, which represents them as
parens patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and
to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow from that status.

In other words, where suits challenging federal laws are concerned, Massachusetts v. Mellon held that it is the federal government, and not the states, that is entitled to act as parenspatriae."
To be sure, the parenspatriae rule that Justice Sutherland articulated did not spring from whole cloth in Mellon.43 Rather, as
Professors Woolhandler and Collins have explained, the origins of
the rule for which Massachusetts v. Mellon came to stand can easily be found in nineteenth-century doctrine, in which "states could
not (in federal court) ordinarily litigate against the federal government or other states conflicting claims to regulate, nor could
they seek to enforce their own legislation or to vindicate their extra statutory interests in protecting their citizenry."44
Whatever its origins, Massachusetts v. Mellon was hardly alone
in this regard. Indeed, the U.S. Reports are replete with contemporaneous decisions in which the Court routinely rejected comparable claims to state standing. Thus, in Texas v. ICC, Texas
sought to challenge the constitutionality of key provisions of the

40. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. See id.; see also Robert A. Weinstock, The Lorax State: Parens Patriaeand the
Provision of Public Goods, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 839 (2009) (discussing the holding in
Mellon).
43. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 33, at 392-93; supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
44. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 33, at 393, 410-19, 426-28 & n.144 & 149,
431-34.
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Transportation Act of 1920 on the ground that they exceeded
Congress's powers to regulate interstate commerce. 45 But the
Court unanimously ruled against the state's standing to proceed,
at least without a more obvious injury to Texas's sovereign interests."
And comparable claims were made-and rejected-in Florida
v. Mellon47 and New Jersey v. Sargent.48 In the former case, Florida sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from collecting
certain taxes imposed by section 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926
on the ground that the taxes exceeded Congress's powers under
Article I, Section 8." The Justices ruled against Florida's standing, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon for the proposition that "there
is no substance in the contention that the state has sustained, or
is immediately in danger of sustaining, any direct injury as the
result of the enforcement of the act in question."" Sargent, like
Texas v. ICC before it, held that challenges to the scope of federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause were not properly
brought by states absent some showing that some unique state
interest was implicated."
But perhaps the Court's strongest affirmation of the bar on
state standing as parens patriaecame in a case in which the Justices allowed the state to proceed-Georgiav. PennsylvaniaRailroad Co., decided in 1945.52 There, Georgia invoked the Court's
original jurisdiction for the purpose of bringing a federal antitrust
claim against twenty private railroad companies. In explaining
why Georgia had standing to proceed, Justice Douglas-writing
for a 5-4 majority-accepted that "Georgia may maintain this suit
as parens patriae acting on behalf of her citizens though here, as
in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., we treat the injury to the

45. 285 U.S. 158, 159, 162-64 (1922) (citing Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, 41
Stat. 456, 469, 474 (repealed 1926)).
46. See id. at 162-64.
47. 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
48. 269 U.S. 328 (1926).
49. See Mellon, 273 U.S. at 15-16 (citing Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 1939 (1926)).
50. Id. at 16, 18.
51. See Sargent, 269 U.S. at 334-40; Texas, 258 U.S. at 62, 64 (holding that the state
of Texas did not have standing to challenge a federal statute).
52. 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
53. Id. at 443.

854

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:845

State as proprietor merely as a 'makeweight."', 4 This was not inconsistent with Massachusetts v. Mellon because, as he explained,
this [is not] a situation where the United States rather than Georgia
stands as parenspatriaeto the citizens of Georgia. This is not a suit
like those in Massachusetts v. Mellon, and Floridav. Mellon, where a
State sou5 ght to protect her citizens from the operation of federal
statutes.

Indeed, the critical points in Georgia were that (1) the state
was not suing the federal government; and (2) it was affirmatively seeking to enforce federal law, rather than challenge it." Thus,
Georgia appeared only to reinforce Massachusetts v. Mellon's categorical bar on state suits as parens patriae against the federal
government-the idea that a state has no sovereign interest in
protecting its citizens from the operation of federal law."
At the same time, Georgia also suggested that states might
sometimes have "quasi-sovereign" interests "in all the earth and
air within its domain."" Thus, whereas Georgia reinforced a
state's sovereign interest in enforcing the federal rights of its citizens, it also opened the door to additional interests that might
suffice in future cases to create state standing-at least against
non-federal defendants.
B. Snapp and "Quasi-Sovereign"Interests
The Court's most detailed discussion of the various state interests that might support its standing came some thirty-five years
later in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. PuertoRico ex rel. Barez."
In Snapp, Puerto Rico sued a group of Virginia apple growers,
claiming that the defendants had violated federal law by refusing
54. Id. at 450-52 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 446-47 (citation omitted).
56. See id.
57. See id. ("The enforcement of the criminal sanctions of these acts has been entrusted exclusively to the federal government. But when it came to other sanctions Congress
followed a different course and authorized civil suits not only by the United States but by
other persons as well. And we find no indication that, when Congress fashioned those civil
remedies, it restricted the States to suits to protect their proprietary interests. Suits by a
State, parens patriae, have long been recognized. There is no apparent reason why those
suits should be excluded from the purview of the anti-trust acts." (citation omitted)); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923).
58. See 324 U.S. at 447-48 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237
(1907) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
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to honor a federal statutory preference for U.S. workers (including Puerto Rican citizens) over temporary foreign workers."o Assuming for the sake of argument that Puerto Rico was a "state,"
the Court unanimously sustained its standing." As Justice White
explained for the majority, "[a] State does not have standing as
parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government. Here, however, the Commonwealth is seeking to secure the
federally created interests of its residents against private defendants."62
Before reaching this conclusion, though, the Court devoted a
fair amount of time to articulating the myriad of interests states
might have as plaintiffs." As Justice White wrote, "if the State is
only a nominal party without a real interest of its own-then it
will not have standing under the parens patriae doctrine."64 To
have parenspatriae standing, then, "the State must assert an injury to what has been characterized as a 'quasi-sovereign' interest."" Because, as White conceded, this formulation "is a judicial
construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition,"
the Court concluded that "[i]ts nature is perhaps best understood
by comparing it to other kinds of interests that a State may pursue and then by examining those interests that have historically
been found to fall within this category.""
The list the Court then expounded included two "easily identified" sovereign interests: "[T]he exercise of sovereign power over
individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction-this involves the power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and
criminal; [and] second, the demand for recognition from other
sovereigns-most frequently this involves the maintenance and
recognition of borders."" The Court also identified two kinds of
"nonsovereign interests" that might give rise to standing: proprie-

60.
61.

See id. at 594-99.
See id. at 608 n.15 ("[W]e agree with the lower courts and the parties that the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is similarly situated to a State in this respect: [iut has a
claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as strong as that of
any State.").
62. Id. at 610 n.16 (citations omitted). Justice White seemed to find it relevant that
"the Secretary of Labor has represented that he has no objection to Puerto Rico's standing
as parenspatriae under these circumstances." Id.
63. Id. at 607-08.
64. Id. at 600.
65. Id. at 600-01.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 601.
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tary interests and private interests pursued by the state as a
nominal party." In contrast to these categories, "quasi-sovereign
interests ... consist of a set of interests that the State has in the

well-being of its populace."69 As Justice White conceded,
[flormulated so broadly, the concept risks being too vague to survive
the standing requirements of Art. III: A quasi-sovereign interest
must be sufficiently concrete to create an actual controversy between
the State and the defendant. The vagueness of this concept can only
70
be filled in by turning to individual cases.

Thus, after surveying a number of prior cases, Justice White distilled them into two general categories: "First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both physical
and economic-of its residents in general. Second, a State has a
quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its
rightful status within the federal system."
Snapp's summary of state interests is useful, but comes with a
critical caveat: all of the interests Snapp identified were in suits
against non-federal defendants. The Court nowhere seemed to
suggest that anything other than a direct injury to the state as
such would support standing to sue the federal government.
To tie things together, consider the Court's most recent foray
into state standing: its 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. 72
There, the Court concluded that Mellon did not foreclose Massachusetts's standing to challenge the failure of the Environmental
Protection Agency to conduct rulemaking to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions by motor vehicles.7 ' This was so, Justice Stevens
reasoned, because of the "critical difference between allowing a
State 'to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes' (which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it has standing to do)."74
Because Mellon did not apply, the majority turned to ordinary Ar-

68. Id. at 601-02.
69. Id. at 602.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 607.
72. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
73. Id. at 505, 519-20 & n.17 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484-85
(1923)).
74. Id. at 519-20 & n.17 (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945))
(emphasis added) (citing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485); see also id. at 520 n.17 ("Massachusetts
does not here dispute that the Clean Air Act applies to its citizens; it rather seeks to assert
its rights under the Act.").

2012]

STATES' RIGHTS AND STATE STANDING

857

ticle III analysis-relying on the conclusion that rising sea levels
would directly injure Massachusetts's proprietary interests as a
coastal property owner. In light of that conclusion, the majority
held that Massachusetts had Article III standing to proceed, and
reached the merits.
I do not mean to oversimplify the point (or the case law). For
present purposes, it suffices to note that the Court has held fast
to the parens patriae rule in suits by states against the federal
government, and has recognized limited exceptions based entirely
on the argument that, in particular cases, the plaintiff state possesses unique interests as a matter of federal law. 7 States are
free to sue the federal government (or federal officers) to enforce
their federal rights, but not to enforce the federal rights of their
citizens-or to protect their citizens from the operation of federal
laws." With that understanding in mind, Part III turns to the
cases where, without detailed discussion of Mellon, the Court has
nevertheless allowed states to proceed as plaintiffs against the
federal government.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S QUIETER STATE STANDING CASES

Those who argue in support of broad theories of state standing
typically invoke in support the handful of noteworthy Supreme
Court cases prominently featuring states as plaintiffs in constitutional challenges to federal regulation." But as this Part will
demonstrate, upon closer examination, each of the cases that tend
to be featured in such discussions reveal a federal constitutional
interest specifically possessed by the plaintiff state as such.

75. See id. at 520 n.17, 521-26; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 264-65 (6th ed. 2009).
76. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 526-27. Writing for the dissenters, Chief Justice Roberts disagreed on both counts-i.e., that Mellon didn't bar standing, and that Massachusetts could otherwise satisfy the Article III test. See id. at 536-47.
77. See id. at 520 n.17; see also text accompanying notes 35-76.
78. See Massachusetts, 262 U.S. at 485-86 (1923).

79.

See, e.g., Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, et al., State Sovereign Standing: Often

Overlooked, But Not Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 89, 108-10 (2012) (citing Bond v. United
1318 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54,
States, - U.S. _, _,
65 (1986); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 & n.1 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)).
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A. South Carolina and Mitchell: Voting Rights and Election
Control
As noted above, the Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach only reached on the merits South Carolina's argument
that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 exceeded Congress's constitutional authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment."
Such claims seem to fit comfortably within the distinction suggested above because the Fifteenth Amendment has been held only to reach state action, and so only in the most exceptional case
could the federal government, through the Fifteenth Amendment,
intrude on the rights of private citizens." Thus, Chief Justice
Warren drew a sharp distinction between South Carolina's Fifteenth Amendment argument and its claims based on the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Bill of Attainder
Clause of Article I, and separation of powers.82 In his words, a
state does not "have standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parenspatriae of every American citizen."8 3
This distinction returned to the forefront four years later, when
the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mitchell considered the constitutionality of various provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970.84 Among other things, the Act lowered the voting
age in all U.S. elections to eighteen;" suspended all literacy tests
for five years;" and abolished residency requirements in presidential elections." In Mitchell, the Court consolidated four different suits: one each by Oregon and Texas challenging Congress's
power to fix an eighteen-year-old minimum voting age; and two
brought by the United States against Arizona and Idaho, respec-

80. 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966); see supranotes 15-18 and accompanying text.
81. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1875); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875); supra Part IIA-B; see also Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing
Representation:CongressionalPower to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2347-60 (2003) (summarizing
the ongoing debate over the Cruikshank and Reese decisions).
82. South Carolina,383 U.S. at 323-24.
83. Id. at 324.
84. 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970) (discussing Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1
(2006)).
85. § 301, 84 Stat. at 318; Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117.
86. § 201, 84 Stat. at 315; Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117.
87. § 202, 84 Stat. at 316-17; Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117.

STATES' RIGHTS AND STATE STANDING

2012]1

859

tively, each of which sought to adjudicate the validity of the
eighteen-year-old voting age, along with the literacy test ban (in
Arizona) and the abolition of residency requirements (in Idaho)."
Because of the latter two suits, "[n]o question has been raised
concerning the standing of the parties or the jurisdiction of this
Court."" Nevertheless, Justice Black (who announced the judgment of the Court) went out of his way to emphasize the extent to
which the Constitution-and not just the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-divided authority over elections between
the state and federal governments.o In federal elections, "the
Constitution allotted to the States the power to make laws regarding national elections, but provided that if Congress became
dissatisfied with the state laws, Congress could alter them."" And
in state and local elections, "the whole Constitution reserves to
the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local
elections, except to the limited extent that the people through
constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers
of the States."" Underlying this discussion was a key insightthat the Constitution confers upon the states themselves a
uniquely federal interest in supervising state and local elections."
Whether or not that interest barred Congress from imposing supervening qualifications, it certainly sufficed to empower states to
challenge legislation that did so. After all, what private party
would have standing to challenge the nationwide lowering of the
voting age?

88.

See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 117 n.1 (citations omitted).

89.

Id.

90. Id. at 123-26. On the only issue that truly divided the Justices-whether Congress had the constitutional authority by statute to lower the voting age in all U.S. elections to eighteen-the Court famously fractured, and Black's solo opinion controlled. See
id. at 117-18. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall thought the answer was
yes while Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun thought the
answer was no. See id. Justice Black split the difference, voting with Douglas, Brennan,
White, and Marshall in favor of Congress's power to lower the voting age in federal elections, but with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun against
Congress's power to so provide in state and local elections. See id. The latter holding was
subsequently overturned by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI,
§ 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age.").

91.
92.
93.

Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 123.
Id. at 125.
See id.
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Thus, although Mitchell did not turn on state standing, Justice
Black's discussion helps to drive home Chief Justice Warren's
holding four years earlier in South Carolina: states are the relevant stakeholders when it comes to constitutional challenges to
the congressional imposition of federal voting rights. Although
there may be circumstances in which federal law also creates other stakeholders, such as local governments and municipalities,"
allowing states to sue the federal government in such circumstances is not just appropriate, but in most cases necessary.96
B. South Carolina v. Regan: Taxing and the Tenth Amendment
Chronologically (and, as we shall see, analytically) the next
Supreme Court case often invoked as supporting broad theories of
state standing is South Carolinav. Regan," in which South Carolina sought to challenge a federal statute that purported to eliminate the income tax exemption for the interest earned on certain
classes of state-issued bonds." South Carolina invoked the
Court's original jurisdiction, and sought leave to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute under the Tenth Amendment and
the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity."

94. Compare id. at 123-25, with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307-08,
335 (1966).
, 129 S. Ct.
95. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193,
2504, 2513-17 (2009).
96. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 33, at 492 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2)
("Presumably the state sought to litigate its own liberty interest in setting voter qualifications, as provided by specific provisions of the Constitution that expressly contemplate
state power to set such qualifications ....").
97. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-420) (citing South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378
(1984)).
98. Regan, 465 U.S. at 370-71; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-248, § 310(b)(1), 96 Stat. 324, 595 (1982) (repealed 1986). The practical effect of
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA") would have been, as
South Carolina argued, "to require [states] to issue [their] obligations in registered form,"
thereby "destroy[ing the states'] freedom to issue obligations in the form that [they]
choose[]." Regan, 465 U.S. at 371-72 (citing Voting Rights Act Amendment § 310(b)(1), 96
Stat. at 595).
99. Regan, 465 U.S. at 370.
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The Court voted 8-1 to grant leave to file.oo And although the
crux of the Justices' analysis focused on analyzing the applicability vel non of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act,"o' both Justice Brennan's majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence seized
0 ' Writing for the
on South Carolina's unique interests in the suit."
majority, Justice Brennan emphasized that, although TEFRA
could negatively impact South Carolina, the state had no alternative means of vindicating its interests-including via private suit
by a third party.0 ' Thus, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act should not
apply:
First, instances in which a third party may raise the constitutional
rights of another are the exception rather than the rule. More important, to make use of this remedy the State "must first be able to
find [an individual] willing to subject himself to the rigors of litigation against the Service, and then must rely on [him] to present the
relevant arguments on [its] behalf." Because it is by no means certain that the State would be able to convince a taxpayer to raise its
claims, reliance on the remedy suggested by the Secretary would
create the risk that the Anti-Injunction Act would entirell deprive
the State of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims.

As such, South Carolina should be able to proceed in order to
vindicate whatever rights it might possess as a state under the
Tenth Amendment and the doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity.0 s And although Justice O'Connor disagreed with some
of Justice Brennan's analysis of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, she
agreed with the bottom line for largely the same reason, highlighting "a State qua State's Tenth and Sixteenth Amendment
tax claims" as a basis for invoking the constitutional avoidance
canon in interpreting the Tax Anti-Injunction Act not to apply. 06
As for whether the Court should exercise its discretion to deny
leave to file, her answer turned on South Carolina's unique interests:

100. Id. Justice Stevens dissented in part, concluding that, even if the Tax AntiInjunction Act did not apply, the Court should deny leave to file as an exercise of discretion, given that South Carolina's claims were ultimately meritless. See id. at 403 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. See id. at 372-82 (majority opinion) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1982)).
102. See id. at 378-80; id. at 401-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 378-81 (majority opinion).
104. Id. (alterations in original) (emphases added) (citations omitted) (footnote call
number omitted) (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 747 n.21 (1974)).
105. Id. at 370, 380-82.

106. Id. at 384-85, 394-95, 398, 402-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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[T]he State qua State has demonstrated that it has no adequate alternative forum in which to raise its unique Tenth and Sixteenth
Amendment claims. If the State issues bearer bonds and urges its
purchasers to contest the legality of § 103()(1), it will suffer irremedial injury. The purchasers will inevitably demand higher interest
rates as compensation for bearing the risk of future potential federal
taxes. Conversely, if the State foresakes bearer bonds in favor of registered ones, it will bear the increased expense that issuers of registered bonds incur, and it will be unable ever to contest the constitutionality of § 103(j)(1). In short, the State will suffer irremedial
10
injury if the Court does not assume original jurisdiction. '

Because only a state could have affirmative claims in such cases
under the Tenth and Sixteenth Amendments, it made sense to allow South Carolina to proceed.a'
C. South Dakota v. Dole: Coercion and the Spending Clause
Similar logic can be found in the Court's next implicit foray into state standing-its decision three years later in South Dakota
v. Dole, in which it upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that conditioned states' receipt of federal highway funds on
their adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one.'09 South
Dakota's constitutional challenge to the statute raised two claims:
that the Act exceeded Congress's power to spend for the general
welfare, and that the Act violated the Twenty-First Amendment,1 o which "grants the States virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.""n
No one appears to have challenged South Dakota's standing to
raise such claims-and for good reason."2 To whatever extent the
Twenty-First Amendment confers upon the states the power to
set a minimum drinking age (a point that the South Dakota Court
107.

Id. at 401-02 (citation omitted).

108. Id. at 401-02. Justice O'Connor thus drew a sharp contrast with cases in which
"the original party does not present a clear and convincing case that the tax at issue will
impair its ability to structure integral operations of its government and that irremedial
injury is likely to occur absent review in the original jurisdiction." Id. at 402.
109. 483 U.S. 203, 205-06, 210-12 (1987) (discussing 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV 1987)).
110. Id. at 205, 207; see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 ("The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein

of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.").
111. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110
(1980).
112. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-06 (1987).
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did not specifically address),"' that is clearly an interest the
states possesses as states-and therefore the appropriate basis
for challenging a federal enactment. Similarly, whatever else may
be said about third-party enforcement of Spending Clause statutes, a claim that the spending condition is unduly coercive of the
recipient of the federal funds seems most clearly to rest with the
recipient of the federal funds, even if, as in South Dakota, it is
possible to identify non-state parties who also suffer injury as a
result of the federal statute."' Indeed, although Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected South Dakota's arguments on the merits, his
opinion specifically turned on the conclusion that "the enactment
of [higher drinking age] laws remains the prerogative of the
States not merely in theory, but in fact.""' If that were no longer
true, a state may well have a case-not because Congress had exceeded its Article I powers, but because it violated a specific and
unique constitutional interest on the state's part.
D. New York v. United States: Anticommandeering
That specific and unique interest was given fuller articulation
five years later in New York v. United States, in which the Court
struck down the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985 on the ground that it unconstitutionally "commandeer [ed]" the legislative powers of the
states by requiring states to "take title" to certain radioactive
waste as a sanction for failing to otherwise provide for the disposal thereof in violation of the Tenth Amendment."' As Justice
O'Connor explained for the 6-3 majority,
[B]ecause an instruction to state governments to take title to waste,
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be be-

113.

Id. at 206 ("[W]e need not decide in this case whether that Amendment would

prohibit an attempt by Congress to legislate directly a national minimum drinking age.
Here, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage uniformity in
the States' drinking ages.").
114. For example, a twenty-year-old who sought legally to purchase alcohol in South
Dakota would presumably be able to satisfy Article III standing requirements in a suit

challenging the constitutionality of

§ 158. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 23 U.S.C. § 158

(Supp. IV 1987); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (stating the
elements for Article III standing).
115. South Dakota, 483 U.S. at 203, 206, 211-12.
116. 505 U.S. 144, 149, 175-77 (1992) (citing Low-Level Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e (1988)); see U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
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yond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the
power to offer the States a choice between the two. Unlike the first
two sets of incentives, the take title incentive does not represent the
conditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in the
Constitution. In this provision, Congress has not held out the threat
of exercising its spending power or its commerce power; it has instead held out the threat, should the States not regulate according to
one federal instruction, of simply forcing the States to submit to another federal instruction. A choice between two unconstitutionally
coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.

Tellingly, Justice O'Connor's analysis thereby suggested that
the flaw in the "take-title" provision was not that it exceeded
Congress's regulatory power in the abstract, but that it unconstitutionally "commandeered" state policy."' As she wrote,
where the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. If the
citizens of New York, for example, do not consider that making provision for the disposal of radioactive waste is in their best interest,
they may elect state officials who share their view. That view can
always be pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary
to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal Government
that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to
be detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear
the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.1 19

Whatever else may be said about this passage, it clearly turns
on the identification of an interest uniquely possessed by states,
as opposed to by private parties. Although Justice O'Connor elsewhere suggested that
it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in
these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated
to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the
Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by
the States under the Tenth Amendment,

her analysis at least somewhat belies that observation.120 Whatever their textual source, it is simply beyond dispute that states

117.
118.
119.
120.

New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 159, 168-69, 175-76, 187-88.
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possess the federalism interests that produced the constraints on
federal power identified in New York as states-and not merely
as parens patriaeof their citizens."' Otherwise, New York would
have necessarily overruled Mellon and its progeny-and sub silentio, at that. That is to say, the anticommandeering rule for
which New York has since come to stand reflects a unique interest against federal commandeering of state policy that is possessed by the states as such, and not a more general interest in
keeping Congress within the bounds of its regulatory powers.
Although individuals negatively affected by unconstitutional federal commandeering would also likely have standing to challenge
such legislation, it is the state's constitutional interests that such
a suit would necessarily seek to vindicate. 2
IV. VIRGINIA'S STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE

ACA

With the analysis provided in Part II and Part III in hand, we
come to the present dispute over the constitutionality of the
ACA-and to the Commonwealth of Virginia's standing to raise
that argument in federal court. All along, Virginia has disavowed
any general interest that suffices to endow it with standing to
proceed. 12 3 Instead, Virginia's argument for standing turns entirely on the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act ("VHCFA"), which
was signed into law on March 24, 2010 (the day after President
Obama signed the ACA into law) and provides that
[n]o resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he has or
is eligible for health insurance coverage under any policy or program
provided by or through his employer, or a plan sponsored by the
Commonwealth or the federal government, shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage except as
required by a court or the Department of Social Services where an
individual is named a party in a judicial or administrative proceed. 124
mng.

121.
122.

See id.
Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-97 (1976) (discussing the principles govern-

ingjus tertii standing).
123. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 2011). Compare Press Release, Governor of Virginia's Office, Governor McDonnell Signs Virginia Health Care Freedom Act
Legislation (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.governor.virginia.gov/news/viewRelease.cfm?id=88
(announcing Governor McDonnell's signing of the VHCFA), with Peter Nicholas & Christi

Parsons, HealthcareOverhaul:Bill's PassageIs Just the FirstBattle in a Long War; Democrats Turn Their Efforts to Winning over a Skeptical Public and Moving on to Other Policy
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Because no state law at the time required individuals to otherwise possess health insurance, the net effect of the VHCFA was to
do nothing other than create a conflict with the federal ACA,
which required Virginians to do exactly what the VHCFA purported to exempt them from doing. Thus, Virginia based its
standing to challenge the ACA on the extent to which, if valid, the
ACA would preempt the VHCFA.125
A. The Litigation
Before filing its decision invalidating the ACA on the merits,126
the district court filed a separate opinion agreeing with Virginia
that the VHCFA sufficed to create standing.127 As Judge Hudson
summarized the issue,
[t]he Commonwealth argues that it is not prosecuting this case in a
parens patriae, or quasi-sovereign capacity. In the immediate case,
the Commonwealth is exercising a core sovereign power because the
effect of the federal enactment is to require Virginia to yield under
the Supremacy Clause. Unlike Mellon, irrespective of its underlying
legislative intent, the Virginia statute is directly in conflict with Sec12 8
tion 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

As for whether such a conflict was of itself dispositive, Judge
Hudson turned to the Tenth Circuit's "[c]losely analogous" decision in Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, which allowed a
state to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief against a federal
administrative decision that "a Wyoming statute purportedly establishing a procedure to expunge domestic violence misdemeanor convictions, in order to restore lost firearms rights, would not
have the intended effect under federal law.""' Because the Tenth
Circuit there held that "[flederal regulatory action that preempts
state law creates a sufficient injury-in-fact," the district court fol-

Goals, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at Al (describing President Obama's signing of the
ACA).
125. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268; see also Cuccinelli et al., supra note
79, at 91-94.
126. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va.
2010).
127. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 608 (E.D. Va. 2010).
(citing Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008)).
128. Id. at 603; see also id. at 605-06 ("The mere existence of the lawfully enacted statute is sufficient to trigger the duty of the Attorney General of Virginia to defend the law
and the associated sovereign power to enact it.").
129. Id. at 606-07 (citing Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1236).
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lowed suit and held that the ACA's putative preemption of the
VHCFA sufficed to confer standing upon Virginia to challenge the

ACA. 30
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
district court's judgment.' As Judge Motz noted for the unanimous three-judge panel,
the question presented here is whether the purported conflict between the individual mandate and the VHCFA actually inflicts a
sovereign injury on Virginia. If it does, then Virginia may well possess standing to challenge the individual mandate. But if the
VHCFA serves merely as a smokescreen for Virginia's attempted
vindication of its citizens' interests, then settled precedent bars this
.132
action.

Turning to that issue, Judge Motz seized on the fact that, "in
each case relied on by Virginia, in which a state was found to possess sovereign standing, the state statute at issue regulated behavior or provided for the administration of a state program."33
In contrast, "the VHCFA regulates nothing and provides for the
administration of no state program. Instead, it simply purports to
immunize Virginia citizens from federal law. In doing so, the
VHCFA reflects no exercise of 'sovereign power,' for Virginia
lacks the sovereign authority to nullify federal law." 3 4 Thus, as
Judge Motz concluded,
[t]he presence of the VHCFA neither lessens the threat to federalism
posed by this sort of lawsuit nor provides Virginia any countervailing
interest in asserting the rights of its citizens. After all, the action of
a state legislature cannot render an improper state parens patriae
lawsuit less invasive of federal sovereignty. Nor does a state acquire
some special stake in the relationship between its citizens and the
federal government merely by memorializing its litigation position in
a statute. To the contrary, the VHCFA, because it is not even hypothetically enforceable against the federal government, raises only
"abstract questions of political power, of sovereignty, of government."

130.
131.

Id. at 606-07 (quoting Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242).
Virginia ex rel. Cucinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601 (E.D. Va. 2010), Va-

cated 656 F.3d 253, 273 (4th Cir. 2011).
132. Id. at 269.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 270; see also id. ("Moreover, the individual mandate does not affect Virginia's ability to enforce the VHCFA. Rather, the Constitution itself withholds from Virginia
the power to enforce the VHCFA against the federal government." (citing Ohio v. Thomas,
173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899))).
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The Constitution does not permit a federal court to answer such
.135
questions.

Otherwise, as the panel concluded, "a state could acquire

standing to challenge any federal law merely by enacting a statute-even an utterly unenforceable one-purporting to prohibit
the application of the federal law,"'36 and could thereby become "a
roving constitutional watchdog of sorts; no issue, no matter how
generalized or quintessentially political, would fall beyond a
state's power to litigate in federal court."' Because such a result
would "contravene[ settled jurisdictional constraints," the Court
of Appeals rejected it."'
Virginia subsequently petitioned for certiorari.'" Although the
Court has since decided to hear a full panoply of questions related
to the constitutionality of the ACA, it has done so in the context of
cases including at least some non-state plaintiffs (in which the
state standing issue is not squarely presented), and has taken no
action whatsoever on Virginia's petition.'4 0 Thus, however the
ACA ultimately fares in the Supreme Court, it seems safe to say
that the Fourth Circuit will have the last word-at least for
now-on whether a state has standing to challenge it.
B. Analysis
Situated against the discussion provided in Parts II and III of
this essay, it seems clear that the Fourth Circuit had the better of
the standing analyses. First, preemption, of and by itself, cannot
create a sufficient interest on the state's part to get around

135. Id. at 271 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485 (1923)) (citations
omitted).
136. Id. Presumably, such standing would enable a state not merely to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal statute, but also its applicability, especially if an otherwise
valid federal law might not in fact preempt the state law invoked as the basis for standing.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand how Virginia's standing theory would distinguish between the two cases-preemption either is sufficient to support standing to challenge a
federal statute or it isn't; the basis for the challenge should be irrelevant.
137. Id. at 272.
138. Id.
U.S. _ (Sept. 30, 2011) (No. 11-420).
139. Id. at 253, petition for cert. filed,_
140. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Because it is beyond dispute that at least one
plaintiff has standing to raise each claim here . . . this case is justiciable, and we are per,
mitted, indeed we are obliged, to address the merits of each."), cert. granted, 565 U.S.
132 S. Ct. 604 (Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398).
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Mellon."' Wyoming, the Tenth Circuit decision on which the Virginia district court rested its analysis, is not to the contrary. 142
There, as was true in Massachusetts v. EPA, 4 ' Wyoming's suit
was specifically authorized by (and brought pursuant to) the Administrative Procedure Act.'4 4 The issue before the Tenth Circuit
was only whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in interpreting a federal
statute;"' like Massachusetts before it, Wyoming was asserting
its statutory rights under federal law.146 The same can be said
about the two circuit decisions on which the Wyoming court rested-both involved situations in which states sued agencies for
their failure to comply with federal statutes. 4 1
To be sure, this distinction-between challenges to the federal
government's failure to comply with a federal statute and a challenge to the federal government's purported failure to comply
with the Constitution-may seem semantic. But behind this initial distinction is a far deeper one: the distinction between cases
in which states are suing to vindicate their rights and those in
which they are suing to vindicate the rights of their citizens. Indeed, although the Fourth Circuit seized on the difference between prior cases where states were seeking to protect active
regulatory programs and the VHCFA, which "regulates nothing
and provides for the administration of no state program,",4 8 the
far-more-convincing distinction is between cases in which states
were suing to enforce an interest that. they possessed as states
141. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268-69; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) (holding that states may not bring suits against the federal government as parens patriae).
142. See Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1241-42 (10th Cir.
2008) (discussing the relationship between preemption and state standing); Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606-07 (E.D. Va. 2010) (adopting the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in Wyoming).
143. See 549 U.S. 497, 514 & n.16 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)) (discussing Massachusetts's use of statutory agency review to bring suit against an EPA order).
144. See Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242 & n.6 (citing Administrative Procedure Act § 704,
5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006)).
145. See id. at 1244.
146. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
147. See Alaska v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 441-44 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Congress has expressly contemplated that States may be heard to complain of injury inflicted
by the Orders."); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 231-33
(6th Cir. 1985) ("The threatened injury to a State's enforcement of its safety laws is within
the zone of interests of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act.").
148. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2011).
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and those in which states were bringing the exact same suit that
one of their citizens could have brought.
That is to say, although the Fourth Circuit reached the right
result (and, given their discussion of the implications of an alternative outcome,"' for the right reasons), the analysis might have
been even more convincing had it highlighted one devastatingly
simple fact: there is no federal statute or constitutional provision
that in any way creates or otherwise recognizes a distinct injury
that Virginia will suffer as a state as a result of the ACA's minimum essential coverage provision. Without such a unique interest, none of the cases in which states have been allowed to proceed are apposite. The Fourth Circuit may not have provided the
most convincing analysis, but its result seems entirely unassailable.
Nevertheless, in an article published in the Stanford Law Review, Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, joined by the
Commonwealth's Solicitor General and Deputy Attorney General,
argued not only that the Fourth Circuit had erred, but that the
conception of state standing summarized in this essay was deeply
flawed."o For example, as they explained, "the Supreme Court's
decision that South Carolina had standing to defend its election
laws against alleged overreaching by the federal government
makes [such reasoning] to the contrary inconsistent with binding
precedent, at best, and irrelevant, at worst."m As in their briefs,
though, the Commonwealth's attorneys miss the point, for they
fail to appreciate that what they describe as "sovereign" standing
requires more than merely a preempted state law-and always
has. Even a casual survey of the cases described above underscores this conclusion: state standing against the federal government requires a unique federal constitutional interest on the
states' part, and it would necessarily be bootstrapping to conclude
that such an interest can be manufactured solely by state law.

149.

See id. at 272.

150.
151.

See Cuccinelli et al., supra note 79, at 15-16.
Id. at 121-22; see also id. at 123 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court recognizes state sovereign

standing."). The authors similarly attack reliance on Professor Bickel's work to support
these arguments, even though, as explained above, I think Bickel is absolutely right in
theory, and wrong only in how he applied that theory to South Carolina.It is a logical non
sequitur that misapplication of a principle to one specific case undermines the principle in
the abstract.
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Indeed, and tellingly, nowhere in the Commonwealth's extensive briefing nor in the Stanford Law Review article can any mention be found of the distinction between the nature of the state's
federal constitutional interest in the relevant cases, even though
it is axiomatic that state law could not transgress Article III's
standing requirements any more than a federal statute could.1 2
No matter how many different ways the VHCFA is framed as
creating a "sovereign" interest, such an interest must necessarily
come from federal-rather than state-law for Mellon to make
any sense.

C. Implications: The Perils of Broad State Standing
To be sure, there is an easy and obvious temptation to dismiss
arguments for and against Virginia's standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the ACA's minimum essential coverage provision as nothing more than result-oriented logic. After all, many of
those who have argued against Virginia's standing to challenge
the ACA are more typically aligned with views in favor of both (1)
a fairly liberal interpretation of Article III standing doctrine; and
(2) the constitutionality of the minimum essential coverage provision. At the same time, many of those who have argued just as
forcefully in favor of the Commonwealth's right to proceed on its
own behalf in federal court are more frequently affiliated with
views cutting against both (1) broad conceptions of standing doctrine; and (2) the constitutionality of the minimum essential coverage provision. I imagine that it is exceedingly difficult to find
anyone who believes either that Virginia has standing and should
lose on the merits or that it does not have standing but should
otherwise prevail-although that observation may simply be repeating a far more general (and results-oriented) critique of the
Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence.
For present purposes, I fall into the former camp. And yet, my
goal in this symposium essay has not been to recapitulate the
specific arguments against Virginia's standing to challenge the
minimum essential coverage provision; in my view, Judge Motz's
doctrinal analysis speaks for itself. Instead, my aim has been to
situate the ACA litigation within the more general discussion of

152.

Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (holding that Con-

gress cannot confer standing in excess of Article III).
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the circumstances in which states should be allowed to challenge
the constitutionality of federal legislation as sovereigns. In other
words, whereas my view is that the Fourth Circuit correctly applied existing law to the question of Virginia's standing, what was
missing from the court of appeals' opinion-and what I have
hoped to contribute in this essay-is the normative explanation
for why state standing in such circumstances should be disfavored, regardless of the politics of the moment or the role of stare
decisis.
To be sure, Judge Motz hints at this toward the end of her
opinion for the Court of Appeals, especially in her discussion of
the "roving constitutional watchdog" that states could become
under Virginia's standing theory.' But the real normative case
against broad state standing has three elements-two of which
can fairly be traced to Professor Bickel,154 and one of which cannot.
First, allowing state standing to challenge the constitutionality
(and perhaps even mere applicability) of a wide range of new federal legislation would create a very real risk of converting the
federal courts into councils of revision. If an alleged conflict between state and federal law itself sufficed to sidestep Mellon and
otherwise satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of standing analysis,
there would be no way of ensuring that the challenged federal law
actually injured a specific party; the existence of standing would
be governed simply by the abstract-and in many cases hypothetical-conflict between state and federal law. Whatever else may
be said about the ideological divisions behind the Supreme
Court's Article III standing jurisprudence, the Justices invariably
have common cause when it comes to the patent inconsistency between such an open-ended approach to standing and the intended
constitutional role of the federal courts.155

153. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 272.
154. See Bickel, supra note 1, at 85-88, 92-93 (discussing South Carolina's lack of
standing and state passing affirmative legislation to avoid compliance with federal law).
155. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826-28 (1997) ("There would be nothing
irrational about a system that granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate under one or another variant of such a regime. But it is obviously not
the regime that has obtained under our Constitution to date. Our regime contemplates a
more restricted role for Article III courts . . . ." (citations omitted)).
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Second, and related, state laws like Virginia Health Care
Freeman Act are more than just ordinary legislation. Consider,
for example, Idaho's Health Freedom Act:
The power to require or regulate a person's choice in the mode of securing health care services, or to impose a penalty related thereto, is
not found in the Constitution of the United States of America, and is
therefore a power reserved to the people pursuant to the Ninth
Amendment, and to the several states pursuant to the Tenth
Amendment. The state of Idaho hereby exercises its sovereign power
to declare the public policy of the state of Idaho regarding the right
of all persons residing in the state of Idaho in choosing the mode of
securing health care services free from the imposition of penalties, or
the threat thereof, by the federal government of the United States of
156
America relating thereto.

Rather than providing affirmative state policies, these laws are
better seen as attempts at de facto nullification, since they purport to exempt state residents from having to comply with federal
laws.15' Because it is axiomatic that the Supremacy Clause forbids
state nullification of federal legislation," it appears that the only
purpose such laws serve is to invite the same result, albeit via judicial invalidation rather than outright nullification. To allow
standing based on such laws then is to not only ignore the deeper
principles of judicial restraint on which Mellon and its progeny
rest, but also to take up these states' invitation.
Third, although Bickel never suggested this point, Professors
Woolhandler and Collins have suggested that "expansive state
standing has a serious potential to undermine rather than complement individual standing in constitutional cases.""' This is
true, they argue, because expansive state standing would prioritize claims by states over those of individuals and because of the

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003(1) (West, Westlaw through 2011 chs. 1-335).
157. See THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., NULLIFICATION: How TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 122-23 (2010)) (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-9003(1) (West, Westlaw

156.

through 2011 chs. 1-335) (holding Idaho's law out as a model for future state efforts to
nullify objectionable federal legislation).
158. See, e.g., Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943) (describing the "corollary" of the Supremacy Clause to be that "the activities of the Federal Government are
free from regulation by any state" (citations omitted)).
159. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 33, at 396; see also id. at 504 ("[I]ncreased
state standing could potentially undermine individual standing to litigate individual and
structural constitutional guaranties." (citation omitted)).

874

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:845

likelihood that it would be "majority reinforcing," placing into
tension "[t]he freedom of government" and "the freedom from government.""
Allowing states to sue in virtually any instance of conflict with
federal law would thereby short-circuit the principal means
through which majorities have traditionally exercised control
over the scope of federal power-at the ballot box-and come at
the indirect but potentially unavoidable expense of those constituencies who historically have been left to the courts to vindicate
their rights. Thus, whatever else one might think of the Supreme
Court's standing jurisprudence, its existing doctrine concerning
the standing of states as sovereigns may in fact reflect-and protect-some of the most fundamental principles of American constitutional law.
V. CONCLUSION
Writing for a unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit in 1985,
then-Judge Scalia considered the distinct question of whether
Congress has the power to override the Mellon rule and confer
upon states the power to bring parens patriae suits against the
federal government-that is, whether Mellon is a prudential limit
on standing or a constitutional one."' Although the Court of Appeals held that Congress could confer standing in at least some
cases, Judge Scalia emphasized that the court's holding was a
"narrow" one.' 62 As he explained,
[e]ven assuming that the separation of powers constitutes the only
bar, permitting some state actions on traditional parens patriae
grounds might conceivably implicate separation-of-powers concerns;
and statutory alteration of the traditional parens patriae criteria
might well do so. But at least where the state meets those traditional
criteria; where the citizen interests represented are concrete interests which the citizens would have standing to protect in the courts
themselves; and where the subject of challenge is Executive compliance with statutory requirements in a field where the federal government and the states have long shared regulatory responsibility;

160. Id. at 482-86.
161. Maryland People's Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 322.
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we have no doubt that congressional elimination of the rule of Massachusetts v. Mellon is effective.16 3

In one sense, this discussion dovetails with the analysis at the
heart of this essay; where Congress empowers states to sue to
vindicate their citizens' rights, it is arguably investing the states
with a uniquely federal interest that states may in turn seek to
enforce in the federal courts. But the suggestion that the separation of powers might bar Congress from so providing in at least
some cases goes one step further, and suggests that there is far
more to the Mellon rule than a mere prudential limitation on the
exercise of federal judicial power.m' I dare say that Professor
Bickel would concur.

163. Id. (citations omitted) (footnote call number omitted).
164. See also, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (explaining why Congress cannot confer standing in excess of Article III); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 881, 897 (1983) (offering a more general version of this argument).

